“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”
—Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass
Something in the early chapters of Michael Pollan’s newest book, A World Appears: A Journey into Consciousness, left me skeptical and frustrated. Who or what was bothering me? I count myself a fan of Pollan’s work; the material finds its way into dinner conversations and walks in the park. Almost a decade ago, I adopted How to Change Your Mind (2018) as a required text in my course on meditation, psychology, and psychedelics. Other professors noticed that it always filled quickly and gently mocked the fact, suggesting that a sure fix for low enrollments was adding “psychedelics” to the title.

A World Appears: A Journey into Consciousness
By Michael Pollan
Penguin Press, 2026, 320 pp., $32.00, hardcover
The frustration was not new. Despite its timeliness and usefulness, How to Change Your Mind had bothered me personally: Here was a popular and talented author, in his 50s, finally encountering psychedelics, something we had all done in college. His reporting was entertaining and informative, but I bristled at his enthusiasm, grumbling that his newly discovered passion for questions of consciousness and identity was an immature convert. I mean, after all, where has Pollan been for thirty years?
The answer is that he had been at the dinner table and in the garden. Pollan built a career on what we eat and on the plants that have shaped us, then turned the same attention inward: How to Change Your Mind came at the mind by way of psilocybin and LSD; This Is Your Mind on Plants (2021) by way of opium, caffeine, and mescaline. A World Appears removes the intermediary and goes at consciousness directly. The book advances through four chapters—sentience, feeling, thought, and self—each built on interviews with scientists and philosophers who have staked careers on it. Then, in a coda, Pollan abandons the reporting method altogether and goes alone into a cave.
Pollan built a career on what we eat and on the plants that have shaped us, then turned the same attention inward.
Reading the new book, the old complaint resurfaced with a different flavor. Pollan’s questioning and independence of mind are here. What bothered me was newer than that: the orientation of many scientists in the early chapters, and the sense that consciousness was treated as a concept more than an experience, despite every attempt to define it.
Among the scientists, psychologists, and philosophers on Pollan’s pages are a few congenial repeats from How to Change Your Mind, all happily remembered: William James and Alison Gopnik, who returns to distinguish the narrowed “spotlight consciousness” of adults from the diffuse “lantern consciousness” of small children.
O
ther sympathetic authorities in A World Appears include Matthieu Ricard, Thomas Metzinger, and Kalina Christoff Hadjiilieva, a Bulgarian-born psychologist at the University of British Columbia and coeditor of The Oxford Handbook of Spontaneous Thought (yours for only $175!). Spontaneous thought is a relatively new field, and Christoff Hadjiilieva is a leading figure in it. Her hybrid method, which pairs self-reports of inner experience with brain imaging, she calls “neurophenomenology.”
Pollan finds her unusually alert to the latent politics and power dynamics in her discipline. “There are vested interests in what we do with our own minds,” she tells him, citing as evidence of the field’s bias a paper, “A Wandering Mind Is an Unhappy Mind,” by the Harvard psychologists Daniel Gilbert and Matt Killingsworth. “It’s basically propaganda,” she says. For what? For turning people into better soldiers of the capitalist order. The mind, she says, is not neutral territory, and its politicization spills over into consciousness research.
I confess, I was utterly charmed when she told Pollan that mushrooms are the only legitimate teacher for capturing inner experience, because mushrooms, unlike scientists, have no biases or preconceptions.
One of the delights of reading Pollan, it suddenly dawned on me, is that he keeps putting moments of himself on the page. The first person is built into his method of investigation and reportage, running against the grain of strictly “objective” science and third-person narrative. Not surprising, then, that he reports sympathetically on the minority who call for a paradigm shift: If science is to make significant advances on consciousness, it must admit subjective experience as evidence.
Pollan arrives at the question of self in the fourth chapter, and the discussion takes a Buddhist turn via David Hume. We are primed for it by the chapter on thought. Thoughts and thought-images arise, but two questions accompany the experience of thinking. If a thought arises as an object, who or what is the subject seeing it? And however thoughts arise, spontaneously or otherwise, can a thinker be found? The experience of seeing becomes more interesting than what is seen, and by definition, the self can never be seen as an object. Who would be doing the seeing?
Hume went looking anyway. Entering most intimately into what he called himself, he reported stumbling on some particular perception or other and never once catching himself without one. He concluded that no one was home, arriving at something like anatta in a Europe that had barely encountered Buddhism. Ricard supplies the practitioner’s version, over Zoom from the Dordogne, pacing his library for his 10,000 steps: The reified self is what leaves us so sensitive to praise and blame, gain and loss. Asked whether he has transcended it, he declines the premise. It is not a question of falling back, he tells Pollan, but of how subtle the self-clinging still is.
P
ollan closes with a shift, confessing the quiet voice that has trailed him the whole way: Maybe you’re using the wrong kind of mind. That not only looks deep, it probably is deep, experientially. Definitions and theories, thoughts and concepts, AI and machine intelligences abound—but how do they help? What are the dangers of an appropriation of consciousness by the wrong mind?
Roland Griffiths comes to mind, though he is barely present here. The late Johns Hopkins psychopharmacologist was a memorable figure in How to Change Your Mind: a scientist with a long meditation practice who, pressed by Pollan to describe his own inner experiences, steadfastly sidestepped them. Perhaps there is a hint in that refusal. The self-secret nature of the mind may be a protection, keeping something precious out of reach of the minds most likely to squander it.
The self-secret nature of the mind may be a protection, keeping something precious out of reach of the minds most likely to squander it.
The unconscious also evades superficial investigation, and Pollan couldn’t help noticing: “Nobody talks about the unconscious.” Here again is a simple word, passively recognized and familiar, its meaning depending, as Humpty Dumpty reminds us, on what people choose it to mean. Buddhists will recognize the storehouse consciousness, alayavijnana, which carries many of the contents that depth psychology assigns to the unconscious.The unconscious may sit closer than we assume to what science and philosophy of mind have been calling consciousness. When one makes a Freudian slip, after all, is the slip that gets past the border police of the everyday mind not expressing some truth?
The science of consciousness is in the awkward position of playing catch-up with mind sciences thousands of years old. In Buddhism, the questions of continuity and identity are bound up with vijnana, routinely translated as consciousness, though the Sanskrit carries a dividing, discriminating quality the English does not, and with it the subject-object split at the root of our suffering. Ordinary dualistic consciousness is itself a kind of ignorance, a not-knowing. No wonder Alice asks whether you can make words mean so many different things. Before and beyond our everyday consciousness, there is something else, natural, unborn but existing, largely forgotten in our busyness and distractions.
The coda takes Pollan to Upaya Zen Center in Santa Fe, where Roshi Joan Halifax sends him up to a cave at 9,400 feet. No plumbing, no electricity, no phone, no screens. She assures him it’s a five-star cave and that he will be uncomfortable in a spiritually productive way. She sends him there, he comes to understand, because nothing she could tell him would teach him as much as being alone in the mountains. Halifax poses an experiential koan and declines to explain it. The prize Pollan brought down was not the definitive theory he had gone looking for:
My time in the cave had shown me another way to look at consciousness: less as a scientific or philosophical puzzle to be solved and more as a practice, a way to once again be altogether here, present to life and to this vault of stars.
Pollan confronted the koan with tools that have served him well his whole career—not a wrong mind, but maybe not the best mind or most essential mind. He wonders in the cave whether he had leaned too hard on spotlight consciousness. As for so many others who enter a practice path, something does become clearer about the nature of mind and perhaps our potential.
In the end, my petty annoyance was forgotten, and I was glad for Pollan’s company. For readers already practicing, the book might not move the needle much, but who knows. We all need friends on the way, fellow travelers in a long questioning, sometimes arriving on land, and even then, wanting to share the new and mostly hidden view.
Maybe Michael Pollan is a new friend.
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